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Court of Appeals holds that a “residencypolicy” requiring municipal workers to be domiciled within the geographical boundariesof the jurisdiction serves a "legitimate purpose"Matter of Beck-Nichols, Adrian, and Luchey
v Bianco
, 2013NY Slip Op 01015, Court of Appeals
These three appeals stem from a residency policy that employeesof the School District of the City of Niagara Falls, New York (the District)hired or promoted after the policy's effective date, March 1, 1994, to residein the City of Niagara Falls (Niagara Falls or the City), and maintainresidency there during their employment.
The policy's implementing regulationsdefine "residency" as "an individual's actual principal domicile
* at which he or she maintains usual personal andhousehold effects."
Essentially all three individual had signed affirmationssignifying their understanding that they were required to become domiciled within the City in accordance with the District’s residencypolicy. Subsequently the District's School Board, after an investigation, concluded thatthree employees were not domiciled in Niagara Falls and terminated theirrespective employments with the District.
Supreme Court, in an Article 78 action involving two of thethree employees,
** characterized the District’s policy's definition of residency as creating a "vague andambiguous" standard which, coupled with the Superintendent's failure todevelop adequate procedures and guidelines, "resulted in varied andsubjective interpretations leading to disparate results." The court heldthat the residency requirement was unenforceable, and that any termination of the two individuals involved in this phase of the litigation based on it was therefore arbitrary andcapricious. Supreme Court directed the reinstatement of the two individuals with full back pay and benefits.
Different panels of the Appellate Division considered these appeals. One panel reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment as to one of the individuals(92 AD3d 1272), holding that the District established that the individual wasnot domiciled in Niagara Falls, and therefore the Board's determination was notarbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals affirm this ruling.
A second panel sustained the Supreme Court’s ruling withrespect to the second individual without opinion (92 AD3d 1276) which rulingthe Court of Appeals reversed.
The Court of Appeals explained that a residency policy formunicipal workers serves "the legitimate purpose of encouraging cityemployees to maintain a commitment and involvement with the government whichemploys them by living within the city [citations omitted]."
Addressingthe implementing regulations, the court noted that the regulation define"residency" as "an individual's actual principal domicile atwhich he or she maintains usual personal and household effects." Thisdefinition, said the court, may be criticized for redundancy or surplusage, butnot ambiguity. The word "domicile" alone is enough to convey thesense that the Board mandates that District employees live in Niagara Falls"with intent to make it a fixed and permanent abode."
As to “administrative due process” issues advanced by the individuals, the Court of Appeals pointed outthat the regulations “provide for notifying employees of the residency policyupon initial appointment and promotion; give employees six months afterappointment to come into compliance, and allow the Board, in its discretion, toextend this grace period for another six months; provide for a "seven-dayletter" to afford an employee the opportunity to respond to allegations ofnon-compliance; include a hardship waiver; and exempt non-administrativeemployees hired prior to the policy's effective date, subject to certainconditions.”
The regulations, said the court, “also include detailedforms to carry out the policy. These forms, in one way or another, call foremployees to acknowledge that they have read, understand and agree to fulfilltheir responsibilities under the policy.”
As to claims advanced by two of the individual’s contending that they wereentitled to pre-termination hearings in the nature of a disciplinary proceeding as a condition precedent to theirtermination, the Court of Appeals indicated that it had previously held that aresidency requirement defines eligibility for employment, and so is"unrelated to job performance, misconduct or competency." Thus saidthe court, the individuals were not entitled to a pre-termination hearing such as set outEducation Law §§2509(2), 3020 or 3020-a, which deal with teacher discipline,explaining that in this instance “due process mandates only notice and someopportunity to respond.”
Finally, the court addressed the proper standard forjudicial review in these cases, concluding that the standard is whether theBoard's determination was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.
Conceding that this standard is ‘an extremely deferential one,” the Court ofAppeals said that "The courts cannot interfere [with an administrative body's exercise of discretion] unless there is
no rational basis for[its] exercise . . . or the action complained of is arbitrary and capricious,[a test which] chiefly relates to whether a particular action should have beentaken or is justified . . . and whether the administrative action is
withoutfoundation in fact," citing Pell v Board of Educ. of Union FreeSchool Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County,34 NY2d 222," [emphasis supplied by the court].
The bottom line: the Court of Appeals held that inBeck-Nichols the judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed, withcosts, and the petition dismissed; in Adrian, the order of the AppellateDivision should be affirmed, with costs; and in Luchey, the order of theAppellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted toSupreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
* I
n Longwood Cent. School Dist. v SpringsUnion Free School District, 1 NY3d 385, a case involving which of two school districts must bear the educational costs forchildren who, immediately before their placement in foster care, lived in ahomeless shelter with their mother, the Court of Appeals explained:"Within the general scheme of Education Law §3202, this Court and theDepartment of Education have consistently interpreted residence as akin todomicile. Domicile requires bodily presence in a place with an intent to makeit a fixed and permanent home (see Matter of Newcomb, 192 NY 238, 250[1908])."** Supreme Court transferredthe petition filed by the third individual, Luchey, to the Appellate Division, whichruled in favor of the former employee. The Court of Appeals reversed thisdetermination by the Appellate Division.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_01015.htm