A two prong test is applied in determining if a public official is entitled to "qualfied immunity" when he or she is sued

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A two prong test is applied in determining if a public official is entitled to "qualfied immunity" when he or she is sued
Coollick v. Hughes,USCA, 2nd Circuit, 10-5248-cv

The US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that theSuperintendent of the Connecticut Technical High School System was entitled toqualified immunity in a §1983 action in which she was alleged to have deprivedthe plaintiff of “sufficient notice” before the elimination of her position asa guidance coordinator at a high school.
The Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that in this instance theSuperintendent’s conduct, “even when viewed in the light most favorable to [theplaintiff], did not violate the plaintiff’s clearly established rights."
The court explained that “Qualified immunity protectsfederal and state officials from money damages and 'unnecessary and burdensomediscovery or trial proceedings.'” It, however, is an affirmative defense and thefederal or state officials being sued “have the burden of raising in theiranswer and establishing at trial or on a motion for summary judgment.”
In determining if an official is entitled to a claimed right to “qualified immunity” thecourts apply the two-prong test set out in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808.
The first prong addresses the question of whether thepetitioner “stated a cause of action.”
The second prong of the test asks did the “[g]overnmentofficial’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of thechallenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that everyreasonable official would have understood that what he [or she] is doing violates thatright.”
In this instance the Circuit Court concluded that theSuperintendent’s action “were not objectively unreasonable in light of the lawthat existed at the time of her conduct.”
Further, the Second Circuit said that it has held that whena plaintiff is subject to a collective bargaining agreement that providesadequate post-deprivation procedures, “such post-deprivation procedures . . .are sufficient to satisfy due process” citing Harhay v. Town of Ellington Bd.of Educ., 323 F.3d 206
The plaintiff , said the court, “utilized the grievance proceduresprovided for in the collective bargaining agreement and received a favorabledecision" restoring her to the status she had prior to the Superintendent’sactions and awarding her back pay and benefits.*
In any event, the court held that there was nothing “objectivelyillegal, in a constitutional sense,” in the Superintendent’s action andalthough she may have been incorrect in deciding that the plaintiff did nothave certain rights under the collective bargaining agreement, the plaintiffwas able to avoid any harm through the very grievance procedures in place to remedyany such deprivation.
Deciding that there was no constitutional bright lines transgressedby the Superintendent in the course of her handling the plaintiff’stermination, the Circuit Court ruled that the Superintendent was entitled toqualified immunity.
* The Circuit Court observed notwithstanding her prevailing in the grievance she filed, the plaintiff “persists with this lawsuit for additional recovery of punitive damages and reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and costs.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/f1968e72-dc4f-4691-a240-38fa0d574732/5/doc/10-5248_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/f1968e72-dc4f-4691-a240-38fa0d574732/5/hilite/